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A B S T R A C T   
Political candidates’ ideological positions have been used to explain success in inter-party competition, but little 
is known about how they impact success in intra-party competition. Here, candidates’ positions on the Left–Right 
and GAL–TAN dimensions are analysed in three Finnish parliamentary elections (2011, 2015, 2019). Candidates’ 
ideological positions are measured in terms of their ideological distance from their own party’s median candi-
date. Absolute ideological distances between candidates and their party’s median candidate decrease candidates’ 
preference votes. Furthermore, the effects are contingent on the general ideological position of the candidate’s 
party. However, these interactions do not follow any clear pattern, as more rightist candidates in right-wing 
parties and more green-alternative-libertarian candidates in traditional-authoritarian-nationalist parties all 
experience a decrease in their preference votes. This effect is large enough to be a decisive factor in intra-party 
competition between the last candidate that was elected and the first one that was not.   
1. Introduction 
In open-list proportional representation (OLPR) systems, voters are 
confronted with a difficult task in polling booths, as they must select 
their preferred candidate from a large pool of available options. For 
example, in the biggest electoral district in the Finnish parliamentary 
elections, voters must choose their candidate from lists that comprise a 
total of almost 500 candidates. A situation like this can be frustrating, 
because making an informed choice would necessarily involve obtaining 
information on all relevant aspects of each of the candidates. As this is 
practically impossible, it is not surprising that voters are likely to resort 
to cognitive short-cuts or heuristics in order to select their candidates. 
These heuristics often relate to procuring easily obtainable information 
on candidate traits or party labels, which allow voters to infer the 
ideological and issue-based stances of candidates via stereotyping 
(McDermott, 1998). 
Accordingly, it is no wonder that a majority of the previous studies 
on candidate success in proportional open-list systems have emphasized 
the importance of personal vote earning attributes (PVEAs), such as 
candidates’ incumbency, personal characteristics or locality, while 
candidates’ ideological positions have received only negligible attention 
in this literature. However, a recent article, based on the Finnish case, 
demonstrates that candidates’ intra-party electoral performance is not 
only influenced by the easily accessible PVEAs of candidates, but rather 
that ideological positions also matter and that candidates who are 
ideologically close to their party’s median candidate tend to win more 
votes than those who distance themselves from their co-partisans (von 
Schoultz and Papageorgiou, 2019). In the following, we continue 
exploring the effect of candidates’ ideological positions in more detail. 
More precisely, we provide a more robust empirical test of the effect of 
ideological positions, covering several elections. Furthermore, we 
explore the extent to which the most advantageous ideological positions 
of candidates are contingent on the prevailing ideological position of 
their party. In practice, we analyse how the direction of the distance 
from parties’ median candidates’ positions affects intra-party success, 
for example, if it is more costly for a right-wing party candidate to be 
even further to the right of their party’s median candidate than to po-
sition themselves more to the left, i.e., closer to the overall electorate’s 
median voter. 
Our analyses are based on data from the Finnish open-list propor-
tional representation system in which the casting of (a single) prefer-
ential vote is mandatory (Karvonen, 2010). Voters are not able to vote 
for a collective party list, but all votes for an individual candidate are 
pooled at the party level, creating interesting political conditions, 
marked by strong rivalry between parties as well as between candidates 
standing for the same party. Thus, the Finnish system provides an 
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optimal environment for the study of candidate performance in the 
context of strong intra-party competition. 
In our analysis, we combine two data sources for the three Parlia-
mentary elections of 2011, 2015 and 2019: data from two widely-used 
Finnish voting advice applications (VAAs) and a dataset on Finnish 
candidates, which contains bibliographic and official register data in 
combination with election outcomes. VAAs provide voters with a rela-
tively low-cost option for gaining insight into candidates’ ideological 
positions and they have become widely used in many European coun-
tries (Garzia and Marschall, 2012). However, only in a small number of 
countries do VAAs allow individual candidates’ positions to be directly 
compared to voters’ own responses (Dumont et al., 2014, 147). In the 
Finnish VAAs, this comparison is possible, which may be one of the 
reasons that the use of VAAs in Finland has been steadily increasing. 
According to Statistics Finland survey, 49% of the electorate had used at 
least one voting advice application during the 2019 parliamentary 
election campaign, compared to 45% in 2015 (Suomen virallinen tilasto, 
2019). Voters’ enthusiasm towards VAAs has been used by candidates, 
as more than 85% of the eight parliamentary parties’ candidates created 
their own profiles in the two most used VAAs (the Finnish Broadcasting 
Company [Yle] and Helsingin Sanomat) in the last three elections. 
We analyse the extent to which candidates’ ideological positions 
significantly impacted intra-party competition in three Finnish elec-
tions. We further explore, if the effect of an individual candidate’s 
ideological position is contingent on the ideological position of their 
party. Our hypotheses are derived from two central voting theories: the 
proximity model (Downs, 1957) and the directional voting model 
(Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Furthermore, we test the hypoth-
eses on two political dimensions: the Left–Right dimension and the 
GAL–TAN dimension. 
The results confirm that the distance of the candidates’ ideological 
positions from those of their party’s median candidate, across both di-
mensions, decrease candidates’ individual vote shares. While the effects 
are small, in comparison to some other control variables used in the 
analysis, they are often large enough to be a decisive factor in the intra- 
party competition between the last candidate that was elected and the 
first one that was not. The results on the direction of the distance are 
more diverse. Our analysis shows that, in right-wing parties, candidates 
who position themselves even further to the right than their own party’s 
median candidate are more likely to lose personal votes compared to 
their more moderate co-partisans. However, in populist or radical right 
TAN parties, ideological purity is rewarded, as candidates positioning 
themselves ideologically towards the centre are penalized by voters. 
Among the leftist or GAL parties we do not observe similar effects. 
2. Candidate strategy under OLPR 
The literature on electoral systems suggests that optimal campaign 
strategies for vote-maximizing candidates look very different, depend-
ing on the electoral context. While single-member districts incentivize 
candidates to pursue the median voter, systems with high levels of intra- 
party competition encourage candidates to target discrete voter cohorts 
(Ames, 1995; Cox, 1990). When there are many candidates competing 
for votes under the same party label, and many seats to be distributed, 
there is little need to try to appeal to all voters in the district; rather, 
attracting a small slice of the electorate can be enough to secure a seat. 
This niche-strategy receives empirical support in the growing literature 
on intra-party competition, demonstrating the electoral value of local 
roots (Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 2015) and 
the friends-and-neighbour effect (Put et al., 2020). Candidates can 
ensure success in these systems by building their support locally and by 
appealing to sub-sections of the constituency (party) vote. 
This niche strategy is further fuelled by the candidate nomination 
process. For seat-maximizing parties, high levels of intra-party compe-
tition, in combination with pooled voting (i.e., where all votes for in-
dividual candidates contribute to the party vote total) are considered 
relatively easy contextual factors for parties to navigate, since they are 
not necessarily concerned about the distribution of votes across their 
nominated candidates (Shugart and Taagepera, 2017). The main focus 
of parties is to make sure that they do not miss any potential votes, 
which they can do by applying a niche-strategy, which involves fielding 
a diverse set of candidates to attract as many potential (sub-sections of) 
voters as possible (Swindle, 2002; Arter, 2013). The problem with such a 
strategy is that it may undermine the ideological cohesion of parties 
(Kitschelt and Smyth, 2002; Tavits, 2009; Crisp et al., 2013; Hix, 2004). 
It also provides a playground for so-called ‘Mavericks’, i.e., candidates 
with a strong personal reputation and an individualistic electoral sup-
port base (Tavits, 2009). 
With regard to candidates, most of the growing literature on intra- 
party competition has focused on their personal attributes, such as 
their previous electoral experiences, local roots or name recognition 
from outside of politics and how these attributes equip them with an 
electoral advantage over their co-partisan competitors (Shugart et al., 
2005; Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 2015; Bengtsson, 2016). Such 
studies show that candidates need personal vote-earning attributes in 
order to stand out from their co-partisan candidates and that they use 
these attributes to cultivate a personal vote. Personal attributes, hence, 
assist candidates to attract personal votes by appealing to different 
sub-sections of the party electorate. Far less attention has, however, 
been devoted to determining the electoral value of the political message, 
in the context of high levels of intra-party competition, or the extent to 
which the candidates’ ideological positions are related to their 
vote-winning capacity (cf. von Schoultz and Papageorgiou, 2019). 
The relative lack of previous studies on the impact of the political 
message does not come as a surprise. Electoral systems with high levels 
of intra-party competition are considered complex for voters to navi-
gate, due to the high number of candidates standing and the need for 
voters to monitor two-levels of competition (i.e., competition between 
and within parties). Under such conditions, voters tend be more 
responsive to simple cues that allow them to reduce the time and effort 
devoted to deciding how to vote (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). Thus, under 
these settings, voters are more responsive to easily accessible personal 
characteristics of candidates, such as gender, age, looks, name recog-
nition, experience and connections to the local setting. Ideology and 
policy positions are generally believed to be of lower importance. 
The effect of ideological positions is, however, explored in a recent 
study by von Schoultz and Papageorgiou (2019), where the authors, 
based on a single Finnish Parliamentary election, demonstrate that the 
ideological position a candidate adopts has an impact on their electoral 
outcomes. It therefore appears as if voters are able to incorporate can-
didates’ ideological positions into their deliberations concerning which 
candidate to elect. The effect of these positions does, however, appear to 
be meagre compared to that of other personal attributes related to 
experience, locality and visibility. 
As mentioned above, the literature on candidate electoral strategies 
suggests that candidates do not benefit from pursuing the median voter 
under high levels of intra-party competition. Instead, they should target 
a sub-section of the party’s electorate and adopt distinct positions, 
enabling them to distinguish themselves from their co-partisan candi-
dates (Ames, 1995; Cox, 1990). This assertion does not, however, find 
support in the study by von Schoultz and Papageorgiou (2019). Ac-
cording to their initial findings, candidates do not benefit from advo-
cating distinctive ideological positions; rather, the overall pattern is that 
candidates who position themselves at the median of the intra-party 
ideological spectrum win more votes. This, in turn, suggests that the 
original median voter theorem (Downs, 1957), taking the full electorate 
as the point of departure, can be translated into the more limited 
intra-party context, providing candidates who adopt a more centrist 
position than their co-partisans with an electoral advantage since they 
are able to attract a greater share of their party’s electorate. 
While the findings by von Schoultz and Papageorgiou (2019) offer an 
interesting contribution, the findings are based on a single election and 
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do not differentiate between parties. In this paper, we build on their 
work and make two distinct contributions to the field. First, we will 
further explore the robustness of the effect of ideological positions by 
expanding the number of elections analysed and by developing an 
analytical model, which includes other potentially influential factors, 
such as campaign spending. This is covered by our first hypothesis to be 
tested: 
H1. Increasing the ideological distance between a candidate and their 
party’s median position provides an electoral disadvantage. 
Second, and more importantly, we analyse the extent to which the 
effect of ideological positions on the two dimensions is contingent on the 
ideological position of the candidate’s party. The findings by von 
Schoultz and Papageorgiou (2019) are based on the presumption that 
the effect of ideological positioning is equal across parties and ideo-
logical dimensions. We will loosen this assumption to explore potential 
heterogeneities and presuppose that the direction of candidates’ 
distancing matters. For example, we hypothesize that, for candidates in 
leftist parties, it makes a difference whether a candidate positions 
themselves (within their party) to the right, towards the median voter of 
the whole electorate or to the left, away from the electorate’s median 
voter. Theoretically, we derive inspiration for our reasoning from the 
directional model (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989), which states that 
voters will prefer candidates that represent clear alternatives, i.e., can-
didates who advocate more extreme positions than those held by the 
voter. 
For parties positioned to the left, the directional model would imply 
that candidates benefit electorally from positioning themselves further 
to the left of the median candidate within their party; candidates in 
right-wing parties, on the other hand, would benefit from positioning 
themselves to the right of the party’s median candidate. This expectation 
is also supported by Sartori (1976, 350), who states that extreme parties 
‘neither desire nor have much to gain in competing centripetally. Their 
goals are best furthered by tearing the system apart’. This notion might 
be applicable to candidates within parties representing distinct ideo-
logical positions, who can benefit from venturing further in the 
dimensional space, away from the direction of the overall (inter-party) 
spectra. The above examples were related to the Left–Right dimension, 
but we assume that similar mechanisms apply also for the GAL–TAN 
dimension. 
It is, however, less clear how to apply the mechanisms of the direc-
tional model to candidates standing for centrist parties. In which ideo-
logical direction would candidates in such parties benefit from 
traversing? After all, the original model was developed in the context of 
plurality electoral systems, with single-member districts; a context in 
which there are usually only two relevant candidates competing, making 
the concept of centrist parties less relevant. We find it plausible that the 
directional model is less applicable to candidates standing for centrist 
parties and anticipate that such candidates, on average, will accrue 
greater electoral benefit from targeting the within-party median voter 
by adopting party-moderate positions. From this expectation, we derive 
at two directional hypotheses, one for centrist parties and one for 
ideologically distinct parties: 
H2.1. In non-centrist parties, more ideologically extreme candidates 
will enjoy an electoral advantage over their less ideologically extreme 
co-partisan candidates. 
H2.2. In centrist parties, candidates that take on positions closer to 
their party’s median candidate will enjoy an electoral advantage over 
more ideologically extreme co-partisan candidates. 
3. The Finnish electoral and party system 
The Finnish electoral system is an open-list proportional represen-
tation (OLPR) system with relatively large district magnitudes (von 
Schoultz, 2018).1 In this system, voters need to assign their (single) 
preference vote for a candidate in their district of residence, taking into 
consideration that these preference votes are pooled at the party-level. It 
is not possible to cast a vote only for a party list. The conversion of votes 
to seats is calculated by the D’Hondt method, where each individual 
candidate obtains a score that is based on the number of party votes 
divided by the candidate’s ranking within the party list. Most parties 
present their candidates in alphabetical order2 and the number of per-
sonal votes determine which candidates will become elected from each 
party list. Thus, the Finnish electoral system is highly competitive at 
both inter-party and intra-party levels (von Schoultz, 2018). In practice, 
candidates compete against other intra-party candidates by organizing 
personalized campaigns, but there is little room for negative cam-
paigning as it could hurt the party’s overall vote share (Karvonen, 2010, 
96). Therefore, the Finnish system provides an optimal testbed for 
identifying the factors determining candidate success in intra-party 
competition, as it is evident that candidates possess very different 
prospects of getting elected (Paloheimo, 2007, 333–334). 
The Finnish multiparty system is one of the most fractionalized in 
Europe (Bengtsson et al., 2014). The three major parties at the core of 
the system have been the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the National 
Coalition Party (NC) and the Centre Party (Centre). According to Rokkan 
and Hagtvet (1987, 81–95), these parties represent the interests of la-
bour, business and farmers, respectively. The populist challenger for the 
stability of the system has been the Finns Party (Finns), mostly taking 
votes from the Social Democrats and from the Centre Party (see e.g., 
Borg, 2012, 197–198). Two medium-sized parties, the Green League 
(Green) and the Left Alliance (Left), both enjoy relatively stable support, 
the first of which represents the emergence of postmaterialist values in 
Finnish politics (Westinen, 2015, 87), whereas the latter is a successor of 
the socialist/communist Finnish People’s Democratic League. There are 
also two other minor parties that have had a continuous presence in the 
Finnish parliament: the Christian Democrats (CD) and the Swedish 
People’s Party (SPP), the latter formed in response to ethno-linguistic 
societal cleavages and continues to represent the linguistic interests of 
the Swedish-speaking population (Karvonen, 2000, 132; Medeiros et al., 
2019). Parties’ electoral results in the three parliamentary elections are 
presented in online Appendix A. 
4. Ideological dimensions 
In this paper, we use candidates’ responses to VAA questions to 
construct two latent ideological dimensions: Left–Right and GAL–TAN. 
Many authors identify these dimensions as capable of illustrating the 
main cleavages within the contemporary political conflict, as the 
Left–Right spectrum encompasses the economic conflict and the 
GAL–TAN captures the cultural value-based conflict (Hooghe et al., 
2002; van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009; Bornschier, 2010). The 
Left–Right dimension has been the most dominant political dimension 
and it has been referred to as a ‘super issue which summarises the 
1 District magnitude ranged between 1 and 36 in the three elections covered 
in the analyses (2011, 2015, 2019). The number of districts was 15 in the 2011 
election and 13 in the 2015 and 2019 elections. The only single member dis-
trict, the Åland islands, is not included in the analyses.  
2 During the three elections under scrutiny here, only two of the parties 
represented in Parliament used ranked lists, and they only did so in a few 
districts. In 2011, it was the Left Alliance (South Savo) and the SDP (Häme, 
Kymi, North Karelia, Oulu). In the last two elections, only SDP stood with 
ranked lists (2015: Uusimaa, Häme and Southeast Finland, 2019: Uusimaa, 
Häme). 
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programmes of opposing groups’ (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976, 
244). Moreover, voters’ perceptions of parties’ Left–Right positions have 
served as a tool enabling voters to conveniently associate parties with 
the bundle of important issues tied to the dimension (e.g., Dahlberg and 
Harteveld, 2016). 
Although the Finnish party system was originally formed mostly 
around the Left–Right dimension, the current party system reflects also 
other ideological dimensions. Paloheimo (2008) has identified as many 
as seven dimensions that have been relevant for Finnish party politics in 
the past: 1) Left–Right, 2) centre–periphery, 3) national–international, 
4) people–elite, 5) Finnish–Swedish, 6) conservative–liberal, and 7) 
ecology–materialism. However, we believe that within-party 
candidate-level ideological differences in modern Finnish politics can be 
modelled successfully with merely two dimensions: Left–Right and 
GAL–TAN. This is because, first, stances on cultural issues reflected in 
dimensions 3), 4), 6) and 7) have started to converge towards a single 
dimension, the GAL-TAN, which over the last three elections has 
emerged as a new major conflict dimension, complementing the Left--
Right.3 In fact, issues related to either the Left–Right or the GAL–TAN 
dimension have been most salient political issues structuring political 
debates in the past three Finnish parliamentary elections.4 Second, the 
conflicts on centre–periphery and Finnish–Swedish language di-
mensions mainly take place between parties, hence positions on these 
dimensions are not as important from the intra-party perspective as 
Left–Right and GAL–TAN positions. 
Although cultural dimension related issues have been prevalent in 
Western European political systems since the 1970s (see e.g., Inglehart, 
1977), the GAL–TAN dimension has become more salient in Finland 
only recently. GAL–TAN stands for green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) 
on one end and traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) on the other 
(see Marks et al., 2006; Rovny and Edwards, 2012). The dimension 
encompasses stances on environmental issues, immigration, rights of 
sexual minorities, international co-operation, traditional values and 
authoritarian rule. The increased saliency of the dimension has been 
linked to the growing electoral influence of green and populist radical 
right parties in Western European party systems (Abou-Chadi, 2016; 
Jungar and Jupskås, 2014; Westinen, 2015). In Finland, these parties 
have also taken up opposite stances on sociocultural issues and are 
largely responsible for politicizing cultural and EU issues (Grönlund and 
Westinen, 2012; Westinen, 2015). EU and cultural issue stances are in 
practice often overlapping (Oskarson, 2010) and therefore, we treat 
both to be part of the GAL–TAN. 
In Finland, the ideological dimensions of Left–Right and GAL–TAN 
have been mostly unrelated to each other. This is also evident in Chapel 
Hill expert survey data, as the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
economic Left–Right and GAL–TAN party positions for years 1999–2014 
is 0.23 (n = 39) and not statistically significant (Polk et al., 2017; Bakker 
et al., 2015).5 
We use candidates’ VAA responses to measure their positions on the 
Left–Right and the GAL–TAN dimensions. For the mechanism of 
candidate ideologies to work, voters are expected to be informed, at 
least to some extent, of candidates’ positions on these ideological di-
mensions. There is growing evidence that voting advice applications 
indeed increase their users’ knowledge about parties’ issue positions 
(see e.g., Munzert et al., 2020). However, we do not expect the VAAs to 
be the only mechanism through which voters are exposed to the infor-
mation on candidate positions. They are able to learn about the candi-
dates’ political messages on social media or through other modes of 
campaigning, such as advertisement in traditional and digital media. 
Furthermore, candidates often use TV and radio appearances or personal 
campaign materials to advertise their distinctiveness from competing 
candidates. The nuances of the ideological differences between candi-
dates may not reach all voters, but at least a significant portion of 
attentive voters are informed about these differences as, under fierce 
intra- and inter-party competition, candidates are incentivized to 
demonstrate publicly their distinctiveness. 
5. Data and methods 
Our analysis builds on a unique dataset, which combines Finnish 
parliamentary candidates’ VAA responses from the two most popular 
VAA platforms, namely the publicly-owned Finnish Broadcasting Com-
pany (Yle) and the privately-owned most popular daily newspaper in 
Finland, Helsingin Sanomat, with a database on candidates’ background 
information and their election results in three elections (2011, 2015 and 
2019).6 Both Yle and Helsingin Sanomat have nation-wide coverage and 
it is therefore not surprising that over 85% of the eight parliamentary 
parties’ candidates created profiles in both VAA platforms during the 
last three elections (see online Appendix B).7 
We restricted the candidate dataset only to candidates in parties that 
at the beginning of the elections campaigning held a seat in the parlia-
ment.8 This narrowed the number of candidates in our analyses from 
6929 to 4837. The reason for the exclusion of parties without repre-
sentatives in the parliament was that they have little electoral 
significance. 
In addition, the dataset was also limited to candidates that responded 
to all question items used in the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for 
each election (4230 candidates). Finally, the dataset was further filtered 
in two ways: 1) the smallest number of candidates per party in a district 
had to be 10 or more and 2) if a party was in an electoral alliance, the 
party needed to nominate at least one third of the list’s candidates. The 
first condition was used to ensure that a party in a district exhibits a 
reasonable level of intra-party competition. The second condition 
removes cases where voters might have an incentive to direct their votes 
toward a single candidate of the minor alliance party. Filtering the 
dataset by these conditions reduced the number of candidates from 4230 
to 4177. 
5.1. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable, the candidates’ intra-party success, was 
measured as a candidate’s preference vote share. The preference vote 
share is a ratio of the votes for an individual candidate divided by the 
number of all votes that the candidate’s party obtained in the district 
3 It was in 2011 election, when according to Grönlund and Westinen (2012) 
cultural dimension became the second most important value dimension influ-
encing party choice after the Left–Right. Arter (2020) highlights that the 2019 
election marked a growing salience of GAL–TAN, as parties strongly related to 
the dimension won 40 percent of the votes. 
4 In the 2011 election, debates regarding the EU, including Finnish govern-
ment’s financial assistance to Greece, were the most salient issues in the media 
(Pernaa, 2012). In 2015 campaigning period, economic concerns regarding the 
growing national debt were dominating the political discourse (Railo and 
Ruohonen, 2016). In the 2019 election, climate change, immigration and 
elderly care became most salient issues (Arter, 2020).  
5 However, it should be noted that in the Chapel Hill expert survey data the 
correlation between general Left–Right and GAL–TAN is 0.48 (p<0.001), but 
this is not relevant for our case as we define Left–Right dimension in economic 
terms. 
6 The main source for election results and candidates’ biographic data was 
the vaalit.fi website, which is maintained by the Ministry of Justice of Finland.  
7 Yle VAA data for 2011 and 2015 are publicly available (see Yle Uutisten 
vaalikone, 2011; Yleisradio, 2015). The Yle 2019 VAA dataset was provided by 
Yle’s editorial staff (Yleisradio, 2019). The Helsingin Sanomat, 2015 VAA data 
were obtained from the Finnish Social Science Data Archive (Helsingin Sano-
mat, 2015), whereas the 2019 Helsingin Sanomat VAA data were collected 
directly from the VAA application (Helsingin Sanomat, 2019). 
8 This also meant the exclusion of Liike Nyt, a political movement that suc-
ceeded in obtaining one seat in the 2019 election. 
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where the candidate stood. This measure was chosen to indicate 
candidate success as it is not affected by changes in parties’ overall level 
of support and focuses only on intra-party competition. The measure is 
thus comparable across elections, districts and parties. Candidates’ 
preference vote shares are clustered based on these three categorical 
variables (in total there are 267 different election-district-party combi-
nations in the data). It is also important to note that the sum of candidate 
preference vote shares within each cluster is one, meaning that the 
preference vote shares are not independent from each other within 
clusters. 
The distribution of the preference vote shares is presented in Fig. 1. It 
ranges from 0.000877 to 0.824 (mean = 0.0591, sd = 0.0749). As the 
values vary between 0 and 1 and the distribution is highly skewed to-
wards zero, a logit transformation was performed to the variable. The 
transformed variable had a mean of − 3.301 (sd = 1.110), its values 
ranging from − 7.038 to 1.542. 
5.2. Control variables 
Our control variables are mostly related to candidates’ demograph-
ical attributes or to their personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs). De-
mographic attribute controls included age, age squared, gender and 
native language (native tongue either being one of two official lan-
guages, i.e., Finnish/Swedish or other). PVEAs used in the analysis were 
related to political experience and celebrity status. Individual in-
cumbency, a form of political experience, has proved to be advantageous 
for candidates in the Finnish open-list PR system (Kotakorpi et al., 
2017). In our analyses, we apply a broader concept of experience, 
serving in the parliament anytime in the past, rather than current in-
cumbency, which captures cases of electoral success in any previous 
elections. Moreover, our operationalization provides us the means to 
overcome issues with current incumbency, as it, for instance, overlooks 
cases where candidates are rotated in and out of the parliament during 
parliamentary terms. 
Political experience was measured by multiple indicators: 1) the 
candidate was currently a municipal councillor, 2) ran for parliament in 
the same district also in the previous election, 3) had formerly served in 
the parliament and 4) was currently a party leader, i.e., chairman of the 
party. Enjoying a celebrity status outside of the political realm is also 
beneficial to candidates, due to increased name recognition among 
voters (see e.g., Zwarun and Torrey, 2011). Celebrity status was assigned 
to candidates by media ascribing them this status. Celebrity status was 
removed from a candidate, if elected (thus, in the next election the 
candidate was labelled as an incumbent, not a celebrity). In addition, 
candidates’ campaign spending was included in the analysis. It is ex-
pected that increased campaign spending enhances a candidate’s 
chances of winning a seat (see Maddens et al., 2006). Finally, a variable 
measuring the number of candidates on the party list was added since a 
larger number of co-partisans will contribute to decreasing the average 
preference vote share of candidates. Summary statistics of all control 
variables are presented in online Appendix A. 
5.3. Ideological distance from the party median 
Our main variables of interest measure a candidate’s ideological 
distance from their own party’s national median candidate. First, two 
ideological dimensions were constructed by performing exploratory 
factor analysis with oblimin rotation via psych R package (Revelle, 2018) 
on selected VAA questions. Using all VAA questions (see online 
Appendix C) would have resulted in incomparable ideological di-
mensions over the election years, as a majority of VAA questions vary by 
content and focus from one election to another. Hence, we first nar-
rowed down the list of possible questions by requiring that the questions 
substantively belong to either the Left–Right dimension or the GAL–TAN 
dimension. In the second step, emphasis was placed on continuity, 
meaning that only small changes between questions over the election 
years were allowed and that the underlying policy topics, (e.g., immi-
gration, social benefit programmes, and taxation) would be represented 
in similar proportion in each set of selected VAA questions per election 
year, thus ensuring comparability between ideological dimensions over 
the years. We also explored party average positions on the selected VAA 
items, which indicate distinctive party-level patterns. The selected VAA 
questions are listed along party average positions in online Appendix C. 
Before conducting the factor analysis, Bartlett’s test of correlation 
adequacy was performed to ensure that the selected questions had 
strong enough correlations to construct stable factors. Additionally, 
scree plots were visually inspected to confirm that the two-factor model 
was adequate for all election years. 
The factor analysis results are presented in detail in online 
Appendix D. The factor loadings for all items were above 0.30 and in 
most cases much higher. However, double loadings emerged for ques-
tions regarding EU membership (2011 and 2015) and for traditional 
values (2015). In both cases, we did not consider this problematic, as the 
support for the EU has been traditionally high among the Finnish centre- 
right and support for traditional values has also been consistently part of 
right-wing politics in Finland, thus explaining why these questions 
contribute to both Left–Right and GAL–TAN dimensions. Next, we 
calculated Cronbach’s alphas for the question items constructing the 
factors. They are clearly on an acceptable level, ranging between 0.73 
and 0.87. Moreover, all calculated fit indices, including CFI, TLI, RMSEA 
and RMSR, were acceptable. Notably, the correlation between the two 
factors increased from 0.19 in 2011 to 0.26 in 2015 and finally reached 
0.32 in 2019. This suggests that right-wing (left-wing) positions are 
becoming increasingly associated with TAN (GAL) stances, suggesting 
that a possible convergence is taking place between the two dimensions. 
Subsequently, candidates’ factor scores were calculated by the 
regression scores method (see DiStefano et al., 2009, 4). Hence, the 
mean value of each factor was as close as possible to zero [− 0.002, 
0.007] and their standard deviations close to one [0.887, 0.954]. Can-
didates’ ideological positions are visualized in Fig. 2. 
Next, we classified the parties on the Left–Right dimension into three 
categories: left-wing, centre and right-wing parties. The inherent diffi-
culty of constructing these categories on an empirical basis is that there 
are no natural cut-off points.9 Here the cut-offs were set to − 0.5 and to 
0.5, which are roughly 0.5 standard deviations from the mean of the 
ideological scale.10 
This meant that a party was categorized as a left-wing party, if its 
median candidate position was below − 0.5 and conversely a party was 
assigned to right-wing category, if its median candidate was above 0.5. 
Thus, the centre category encompassed parties with medians between 
− 0.5 and 0.5. It is noteworthy that median party positions were derived 
from factor scores that were scaled around the mean of the data, but the 
absolute mean values to the Left–Right issue statements are slightly 
leftist (2.33–2.73 on a five-point scale). Hence, the ideological centre, 
calculated from factor scores, might not equate with the exact political 
centre in terms of policy positions, but for the purposes of this analysis, 
these empirically constructed categories serve as sufficient proxies. Out 
of 24 median party positions, 25% were left-wing (PPleft− wing), 50% 
centrist (PPcentreL− R ), and 25% right-wing (PPright− wing). 
The same procedure was performed for the GAL–TAN dimension. In 
terms of party positions GAL–TAN resulted in more parties with median 
candidates at the GAL and TAN ends of the dimension, compared to in 
9 We also used continuous party position variables as an alternative oper-
ationalization, but these variables did not seem theoretically credible, as our 
expectations for the parties in the ideological centres deviate from the parties 
closer to the poles of the ideological dimensions. 
10 Robustness tests confirmed that the optimal number of ideological cate-
gories was in fact three (as opposed to zero, two and four), as we had initially 
thought. Further, the cut-off points used here [-0.5, 0.5] provided the best 
fitting model in comparison to the other alternatives. 
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Fig. 1. Distributions of preference vote share variables. Panel A displays the original variable’s highly skewed distribution and panel B displays the same variable 
after logit transformation, which is used in the analysis. 
Fig. 2. Candidates’ factor scores on the Left–Right and GAL–TAN dimensions by election year.  
Fig. 3. Parties’ median candidate positions for each year and their ideological categorization.  
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the middle, in contrast to the Left–Right dimension. GAL had 46% of 
national median party positions (PPGAL), 29% were in the centre 
(PPcentreGAL− TAN ) and 25% TAN (PPTAN). All median party positions in their 
respective categories are presented in Fig. 3. 
Finally, individual candidates’ ideological positions were compared 
to those of their party’s median candidate and, at first, the absolute 
distance from the median was calculated. This measure is not affected by 
the direction of the distance, i.e., whether the candidate was above or 
below the party median: 
|dL− R,med| = |cL− R − pL− R,med|
where cL− R means candidate’s position on Left–Right dimension and 
pL− R,med represents party’s median candidate position on the Left–Right 
dimension. The candidates’ distance distributions and party-level vari-
ations are presented in online Appendix E. 
In order to test whether the direction of the ideological distance from 
the party’s median is important, the distance from the party’s median 
was split into two categories: 
d ​ right|L− R,med = cL− R − pL− R,med if ​ cL− R > pL− R,med  
d ​ left|L− R,med = cL− R − pL− R,med if ​ cL− R < pL− R,med  
where d ​ right|L− R,med is the distance from the party’s median candidate, 
when the candidate is situated further to the right (above the party’s 
district median) of the ideological spectrum than the party’s median 
candidate. In a similar way, d ​ left|L− R,med is a distance from the party’s 
median candidate for candidates that are more leftist (below the party’s 
median). If a candidate occupies the median party position, the distance 
from the party’s median is zero. The similar procedure was then per-
formed with the GAL–TAN to measure distances from the party’s median 
on this dimension. 
5.4. Multi-level regression analysis 
Our dataset is nested as the candidates exist in their parties within 
specific districts and across election years. Thus, multi-level regression 
was considered to be the most suitable method of analysis. The total 
number of unique election-district-year clusters is 267. Multi-level 
regression models with a random intercept were fitted to the data 
with the maximum likelihood method implemented by the lme4 R 
package (Bates et al., 2015) using logit transformed dependent vari-
able.11 The fixed effects’ p-values were obtained by Satterthwaite’s 
method for approximating degrees of freedom for the t-test using the 
lmerTest R package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). Coefficient interaction 
plots were created with the interplot package (Solt and Hu, 2018), after 
which linearity assumption of interaction effects was scrutinized ac-
cording to suggestions presented by Hainmueller et al. (2019a, b) and 
Berry et al. (2012). Interaction diagnostics are presented in online 
Appendix H. Lastly, predictor effects on the dependent variable were 
calculated with effects R package, which is capable in handling 
multi-level model objects (Fox and Weisberg, 2019, 2018). 
6. Results 
To test the first hypothesis, on the effect of ideological distance on 
intra-party candidates’ success, two multi-level models were fitted 
(Table 1). The first model includes only control variables for the purpose 
of comparison with subsequent models. Almost all control variable co-
efficients were statistically significant with expected signs. 
Table 1 
Multi-level regression analysis.   
Dependent variable: 
logit(Preference vote share) 
(1) (2) (3) 
|dL− R,med| − 0.117*** 
(0.033)   
|dG− T,med| − 0.113*** 
(0.034)   
PPRight-wing   − 0.132 (0.084)  
PPLeft-wing   − 0.198** 
(0.073)  
PPTAN   0.735*** 
(0.088) 
PPGAL   0.571*** 
(0.075) 
dright|L− R,med    − 0.057 (0.044)  
dleft|L− R,med    − 0.231*** 
(0.059)  
dGAL|G− T,med    − 0.021 (0.066)  
dTAN|G− T,med    − 0.057 (0.065)  
PPRight− wing ×




dleft|L− R,med    
0.086 (0.094) 
PPLeft− wing × dleft|L− R,med    0.054 (0.169) 
PPLeft− wing ×
dright|L− R,med    
− 0.049 (0.094)  
PPTAN × dGAL|G− T,med    − 0.225* 
(0.103)  
PPTAN × dTAN|G− T,med    − 0.059 (0.136)  
PPGAL × dGAL|G− T,med    − 0.113 (0.116)  
PPGAL × dTAN|G− T,med    − 0.029 (0.083)  






























































































Election2015 − 0.107 (0.074)  − 0.116 (0.073)  − 0.220*** 
(0.057)  
Election2019 − 0.090 (0.074)  − 0.097 (0.073)  − 0.211*** 
(0.057)  






0.212 0.207 0.106 
(continued on next page) 
11 As a robustness check, instead of transforming the dependent variable, we 
also fitted multi-level beta regression model with logit link function on the data 
with glmmTMB package (Brooks et al., 2017). Beta model results did not differ 
from models with logit-transformed dependent variable (see Appendix H). 
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Age had a curvilinear relationship with the preference vote share. 
Candidates’ success at first increases with age, but, at some point, the 
peak is reached after which age detrimentally affects votes. The coeffi-
cient for female candidates was positive (0.207), indicating that they 
had a higher mean preference vote share than male candidates. The 
effect of the candidate’s native language, when it is not Finnish or 
Swedish, was negative and off the same magnitude as gender. All 
measures of political experience were positively associated with the 
share of the party vote that the candidates attracted. The smallest effect 
was for those standing in a previous parliamentary election (0.266). This 
was slightly surpassed by the effect of holding a municipal councillor-
ship (0.382). Having previously served in parliament had a significantly 
larger coefficient (0.970) and being a party leader had the strongest 
effect of all the variables (1.715). Celebrity status also had a positive 
(0.710) coefficient. In terms of campaigning resources, over 20,000-euro 
campaign budgets were used as a comparison group for other lower 
campaign spending categories. The smallest campaign budgetary cate-
gory had the strongest negative effect (− 1.240) of all control variables. 
In addition, the number of candidates in the party list had a negative 
effect (− 0.424), meaning that a larger number of candidates decrease 
the preference vote shares of individual candidates. Variance of the 
random intercept at the election-district-party level was 0.212. 
The second model included two ideological distance variables: ab-
solute distances on the Left–Right (|dL− R,med|) and GAL–TAN dimensions 
(|dG− T,med|) from the party’s median candidate: both variables had small 
statistically significant negative effects, − 0.117 for the Left–Right and 
− 0.113 for the GAL–TAN distance. The second model showed no sig-
nificant changes in the control variable coefficients, but the variance of 
the random intercept slightly decreased (0.207). Moreover, the second 
model improved model fit indices (AIC and BIC) in comparison to the 
first model. 
In sum, the results of the second model are in accordance with hy-
pothesis H1, which stated that increasing the ideological distance be-
tween a candidate and their party’s district median position provides an 
electoral disadvantage. To better understand the magnitude of the effect 
of the ideological distance variables on preference vote shares, effects 
plots were drawn (Fig. 4). These plots show the predicted values of 
preference vote shares when the absolute ideological distance from the 
party’s median candidate changes while all other predictors are held 
constant. On average, one standard deviation distance from the party’s 
median, on both the Left–Right and GAL–TAN dimensions, decreases the 
preference vote share of the candidate by 0.4 percentage points. A dis-
tance of two standard deviations on Left–Right and GAL–TAN have both 
a negative effect of 0.7pp on a candidate’s preference vote share. 
In the next stage, we set out to test our second set of hypotheses, 
focusing on whether the effect of a candidate’s ideological distance from 
their party’s median is contingent on the direction of the distance. The 
third model in Table 1 expands on the first model. It includes four party 
position (PP) variables (the centre position in both dimensions was set as 
a comparison group), four ideological distance variables (two for each 
ideological dimension) that measured whether the candidate was below 
or above the party median, and interactions between party positions and 
ideological distance variables (e.g., PPRight− wing × dright|L− R,med). We also 
fitted interactions with continuous party position variables and per-
formed linear interaction effect diagnostics suggested by Hainmueller 
et al. (2019a). The diagnostics figures revealed that the interaction ef-
fects were not linear with continuous party position variables. This was 
in line with our hypothesis which states that ideological distance effects 
are different in centrist parties than in non-centrist ones (see online 
Appendix H). 
The AIC and BIC fit indices were best for the third model. However, 
the interpretation of the directional distance variables is difficult as 
multiple interactions take place simultaneously. To assist the interpre-
tation, interaction plots are displayed in Fig. 5. For left-wing party 
candidates, the distance from the party’s Left–Right median position, in 
either direction, did not have a statistically significant effect. For can-
didates in centrist parties, moving to the left of the party’s median 
candidate had a statistically significant negative effect (− 0.231). Posi-
tioning oneself more to the right of the median did not have a significant 
effect. For right-wing party candidates, more rightist positions had a 
negative effect on the candidate’s preference vote share (− 0.310), as 
was the case with those adopting more leftist positions (although these 
positions had much smaller negative effect). 
Table 1 (continued )  
Dependent variable: 
logit(Preference vote share) 




n (Level 1) 4,177 4,177 4,177 
N (Level 2) 267 267 267 
Log Likelihood − 4,613.751  − 4,600.994  − 4,516.044  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,265.503 9,243.987 9,102.089 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 9,385.912 9,377.072 9,323.896 























0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
dG−T,med
B
Fig. 4. Marginal effect of a candidate’s absolute distance from their party’s median candidate in the Left–Right and the GAL–TAN dimensions on candidate’s 
preference vote share. 
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Ideological distances on the GAL–TAN dimension were not signifi-
cant for candidates standing in GAL or centrist parties. Candidates 
standing in traditional-authoritarian-nationalist parties, on the other 
hand, suffered a statistically significant negative effect, if they were 
more green-alternative-libertarian than their party’s median candidate 
(− 0.247). Moving to the other direction (more TAN) did not have sig-
nificant effect. These findings were replicated with multiple robustness 
tests by calculating ideological distance from the party’s leader instead 
of the median party candidate, omitting campaign spending variables, 
changing party position categories’ cut-offs and varying the number of 
party position categories. The results of these robustness tests are pre-
sented in online Appendix H. 
Fig. 6 shows marginal effect plots for the significant interactions of 
the third model. In addition, marginal effects of six control variables are 
presented in online Appendix F. The effect of one standard deviation 
distance to the left of the party’s median candidate on the Left–Right 
dimension decreases the preference vote share, by on average 0.8pp, for 
candidates in centrist parties. For right-wing party candidates, posi-
tioning themselves one standard deviation to the right of their party’s 
median candidate decreases the preference vote share on average by 
0.9pp. Candidates in parties with the most traditional-authoritarian- 
nationalist tendencies decrease their preference vote share on average 
by 0.9pp if they locate themselves one standard deviation from their 
party’s median candidate towards the GAL-end of the GAL–TAN 
dimension. In these three cases, the predicted average preference vote 
share continues to decrease, as the candidate’s distance from the party’s 
median increases, although confidence intervals of the predicted values 
tend to widen as the number of candidates with extreme distances are 
fewer than candidates close to the party median. 
Our hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 considered whether the effect of a 
candidate’s ideological distance from their party’s median candidate 
does indeed depend on their party’s overall ideological position and the 
direction of the distance; however, all of the interaction terms in model 3 
were not as initially hypothesized. Thus, neither of the hypotheses 
Left−wing Centre Right−wing















Fig. 5. Coefficient interactions between the ideological distance from the party’s median candidate and the party position (PP).  
Centre




















More rightist than party
B TAN





More GAL than party
C Fig. 6. Marginal effects of a candidate’s distance to their party’s median candidate 
with an interaction to party’s ideological 
position. Panel A shows a situation when a 
candidate is from a centrist party on the 
Left–Right dimension and positions them-
selves left of the party’s median candidate. In 
panel B a candidate is from a right-wing 
party and has a position right of the party’s 
median candidate. In panel C a candidate is 
from a TAN party and has a position more 
GAL of the party’s median candidate. Mar-
ginal effects of statistically significant in-
teractions shown.   
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received strong support. Hypothesis H2.1 stated that more ideologically 
extreme candidates would perform better in non-centrist parties. There 
is some evidence for this, as more centrist TAN party candidates seem to 
be at disadvantage in comparison to their more TAN colleagues. The 
main proof against H2.1, however, is the result that more extreme right- 
wing candidates’ electoral support is negatively affected by ideological 
distance. Furthermore, on the other side of the ideological dimension, 
candidates in left-wing and GAL parties were not affected by their 
ideological distances from their party median candidate. 
The third hypothesis H2.2 stated that candidates that are ideologi-
cally close to their party’s median candidates, in centrist parties, have an 
advantage over their more distant co-partisans. There was some partial 
support for this hypothesis, as party candidates from centrist parties who 
position themselves further to the left are negatively affected; interest-
ingly, other directions did not seem to have a similar effect. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the magnitude of the ideological 
distance’s effect, preference vote share differences for each party’s last 
elected candidate in a district, along with those for the first candidate 
from the same party not winning a seat, were calculated. These prefer-
ence vote differences, i.e., intra-party winning margins, are presented in 
online Appendix G. In 26% of the cases (n = 61), intra-party winning 
margins were within one percent. They were particularly narrow for 
large parties, including the National Coalition Party, the Centre Party 
and the Finns Party. Moreover, SDP and the Greens appeared to have 
many intra-party races that were decided by small margins. Smaller 
parties displayed, on average, much larger differences between the last 
candidates that won a seat and first ones not to win it. For example, the 
joint effect of Left–Right and GAL–TAN distances can reach an average 
of 1.7pp decrease in the preference vote share for Finns Party candidates 
that locate themselves one standard deviation further to the left and one 
standard deviation more towards the GAL-end of GAL–TAN from the 
party’s median candidate. Thus, when assessing the effect of the ideo-
logical distance variables in relation to the intra-party winning margins, 
one can conclude that the ideological distance can be a decisive factor in 
narrow races. 
7. Discussion 
The main findings of this paper are, first, that we confirm the finding 
of von Schoultz and Papageorgiou (2019) that candidates’ absolute 
ideological distances in relation to their party’s median candidates do 
have negative effects on their preference vote share. This effect can be 
seen both in the Left–Right and the GAL–TAN dimensions. However, it 
should be noted that the effect sizes were rather small in comparison to 
most of the other control variables (only a 0.4pp decrease in personal 
vote share for the increase of one standard deviation in the distance from 
the party median). Second, a more detailed picture of the effects 
emerged when the direction of the distance was considered, although 
our results here are relatively weak and the directional hypothesis does 
not apply similarly to all candidates in both ideological dimensions. 
Neither of the hypotheses concerning the direction of ideological dis-
tances (H2.1 and H2.2) received definite support. However, the results 
showed that centre-leaning candidates performed better in right-wing 
parties than their more right-wing co-partisan competitors. More 
extreme candidates on the GAL–TAN dimension had an advantage in 
TAN parties over relatively more GAL candidates within their own party. 
The effects for both cases predicted about a 0.9 percentage point 
decrease in preference vote shares for an increase of one standard de-
viation in distance. 
Thus, the results indicate that, while intra-party ideological 
distancing from the party median can result in a loss of votes for can-
didates, it is mostly candidates in right-wing and centre parties on the 
Left–Right spectrum and TAN parties on GAL–TAN dimension that 
appear to be affected. Explanations for these deviations from the general 
theoretical expectations derived from the directional model – which 
assumes that the benefits from moving towards extreme ideological 
positions would be equal for left- and right-wing parties or for GAL and 
TAN parties – might be found in context specific circumstances related 
to Finnish politics. The negative effect of a more rightist position for 
candidates in right-wing parties could be explained by the fact that 
extreme economic right positions are quite unpopular with the Finnish 
electorate, as voters tend to support the welfare state and dislike the idea 
of increasing income inequality (Westinen et al., 2016, 284). Further-
more, one reason why candidates in left-wing parties are not penalized 
for their advocacy of extreme economic left positions is that the left side 
of the dimension is ‘short’, as there are no VAA questions identifying 
candidates’ positions on far-left policies, such as radical redistribution of 
wealth or nationalization of industry. In contrast, the right pole of the 
ideological spectrum, constructed via VAA questions, has a much longer 
tail of extreme values. 
We also observed that centrist parties’ candidates, in line with our 
expectation, are disfavoured when their ideological position is to the left 
of the party’s median candidate, which affirms that the widespread 
appeal of these parties rests in their adoption of a centrist position, 
enhancing their ability to attract votes from both sides of the Left–Right 
dimension. Interestingly, candidates holding more rightist positions 
within these parties are not penalized. Lastly, candidates in TAN parties 
are penalized for having more centrist GAL ideological positions, which 
may be explained by the fact that many Finnish voters vote for parties 
over candidates (Isotalo et al., 2019, 16); this could also explain why 
voters might not be willing to risk their vote by opting for a candidate 
with centrist values in a TAN party. It is also possible that the GAL–TAN 
dimension is more polarizing than the Left–Right dimension, which is 
traditionally very familiar to voters and parties alike. 
There are also limitations regarding our data and methods. Using the 
VAA responses to measure the ideological dimensions is not without its 
difficulties. As VAA questions are created mostly for journalistic pur-
poses, they often change in attempt to reflect the political agenda of the 
particular election. It is also possible that candidates use VAA profiles to 
intentionally signal mixed messages to voters, by affirming one stand-
point in the VAA and another in their campaigning, (e.g., social media or 
public events) to broaden their appeal to different audiences. Further-
more, it is also conceivable that parties may want to regulate their 
candidates’ VAA responses, for example, in attempt to elucidate their 
party’s policy positions and to emphasize their party’s ideological 
coherence. 
Finally, even though ideological distances did not prove to be as 
decisive in winning a seat as most of the political experience variables, 
they do have the potential to determine the winner in narrow intra-party 
races. It is also possible that candidates’ ideological positions matter 
more when they are standing for the first time for national or local 
elections. First-time candidates often lack sufficient resources to win a 
seat compared with experienced candidates. Therefore, ideological 
positioning might be one of the few ‘selling points’ these candidates 
have at their disposal. It is left for future research to investigate whether 
the effects of ideology vary among candidate groups and to test if 
ideological positions prove to be of greater significance in narrow intra- 
party races. Alternatively, one might focus on individual issues instead 
of dimensions, even though we perceive dimensions consisting of mul-
tiple issues to be more robust metrics than individual issues, as single 
issues are more susceptible to changes in saliency, which would need to 
be accounted for, thus complicating analyses ranging over multiple 
elections. Issue-based approach would also be more exploratory and 
context-specific in nature. 
In general, our results show that, even in open-list proportional 
electoral systems with strong incentives for individual candidates to 
differentiate themselves from their co-partisan candidates, ideological 
distancing is usually not a winning strategy. Optimal personal results are 
achieved by following the party line. This means that, instead of ideo-
logical originality, candidates need to emphasize other personal vote- 
earning attributes, such as experience, gender, localness or celebrity 
status, if they are to distinguish themselves from competing candidates. 
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From the voters’ perspective, this is both bad and good. More ideological 
variation among candidates within a party presents voters with greater 
choice, which might enhance the representativeness of the electoral 
process. On the other hand, ideological mavericks often muddle parties’ 
ideological message, which, in turn, makes voters’ choice of party more 
difficult. After all, ideologically cohesive parties are likely to improve 
voters’ ability to make informed choices and are also likely to encourage 
more cross-party cooperation in the parliament. 
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